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CHAMELEON CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 
DEREK T. MULLER* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Census Bureau counts the number of inhabitants in the 
United States every ten years.1 That census leads to the allocation of seats in the 
House of Representatives based on the total population of each state.2 And the 
states draw new congressional districts for the decade ahead, districts with equal 
numbers of inhabitants in them.3 
These tasks are ostensibly simple and straightforward. They are designed 
for electing members to the House of Representatives. But congressional 
districts serve many other functions, electoral and non-electoral, which may 
operate below the surface—some of which are common knowledge if we only 
think about them and some of which we may be unaware of. 
Congressional districts, then, are something of a chameleon. They take on a 
different hue depending on their context, from how political parties go about 
choosing a presidential nominee to how the military academies fill out their 
classes. This Essay reflects on some of the alternative roles congressional 
districts serve and whether they ought to serve such roles. 
I.  REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING 
The Census Bureau enumerates the number of inhabitants in each state.4 
Each state receives a number of representatives in Congress based on the number 
of inhabitants.5 
 
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University Rick J. Caruso School of Law. Special thanks to the 
participants in the SLU Law Journal Childress Memorial Lecture and Symposium for organizing 
this event and editing this Essay. 
 1. U.S. Census Bureau, What Is The 2020 Census?, U.S. Census 2020, https://2020census. 
gov/en/what-is-2020-census.html [https://perma.cc/G8L7-85MU] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also Department of Commerce v. United States House 
of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 321 (1999). 
 5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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Congressional districts are redrawn in each state after each census, and 
redistricting must take place subject to particular legal guidelines.6 First, 
congressional districts must comply with “one person, one vote,” which 
typically means an equal number of inhabitants in each district.7 One 
representative represents an equal number of constituents, and states typically 
draw districts based on equal population.8 
Second, congressional districts must comply with the Voting Rights Act. In 
particular, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as understood today, requires that 
districts, including congressional districts, be drawn to ensure that racial 
minority voters have the opportunity to elect the preferred candidate of their 
choice.9 But congressional districts also cannot be a racial gerrymander—that is, 
state legislatures cannot draw congressional districts so that race predominates 
the redistricting process.10 
The Supreme Court has also concluded that the Constitution does not 
empower the federal judiciary to determine whether congressional districts have 
been drawn with excessive partisan intent.11 But states may include additional 
criteria that congressional districts must meet, including avoiding excessive 
partisan gerrymanders. And the state-created independent redistricting 
commissions have particular guidelines to follow when drawing congressional 
districts. 
In California, for instance, the state Constitution instructs the Citizens 
Redistricting Commission to draw congressional districts to “achieve population 
equality as nearly as is practicable,” to comply with the Voting Rights Act, to 
draw geographically contiguous districts, to minimize division of communities 
 
 6. Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and Congressional Redistricting, Brennan Center for 
Justice (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/who-draws-
maps-legislative-and-congressional-redistricting [https://perma.cc/Q29N-X4BU]. 
 7. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964); 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2018). See also Derek 
T. Muller, Perpetuating “One Person, One Vote” Errors, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 382 
(2016). 
 8. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016); Sanford Levinson, One Person, One 
Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (2002). 
 9. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134, as codified 
at 52 U.S.C. § 10103(b) (2016). See also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986) (applying 
statute to state legislative districts). 
 10. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241–42 (2001); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 
(1996); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993). 
 11. Rucho v. Common Cause, 138 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019). Accord Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (plurality opinion) (opinion of Scalia, J.). See also Derek T. Muller, 
Nonjudicial Solutions to Partisan Gerrymandering, 62 HOWARD L.J. 791, 798 (2019); Yasmin 
Dawood, Democracy and Dissent: Reconsidering the Judicial Review of the Political Sphere, 63 
SUP. CT. L. REV. 59, 74 (2013). Cf. Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of 
Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859, 862 (describing role of state legislatures in drawing 
congressional districts). 
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of interest, and to encourage geographical compactness.12 In Arizona, the state 
Constitution requires districts to have equal population to the extent practicable, 
geographically compact, respectful of “communities of interest,” “use visible 
geographic features” and governmental boundaries, and be “competitive 
districts” if practicable.13 Voters amended Florida’s Constitution in 2010 to 
forbid drawing congressional districts “with the intent to favor or disfavor a 
political party or an incumbent,” among other regulations.14 
II.  ADDITIONAL ROLES OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 
In short, there are many constitutional and statutory federal and state 
regimes all governing how to go about drawing congressional districts, often 
with an eye toward particular goals in the election of congressional 
representatives—equality, competitiveness, representativeness, and so on. 
Commentaries understandably focus on constituencies within districts and what 
political representation looks like from such districts.15 But these districts can 
serve many more functions than the purpose for which they have been drawn. 
A. Presidential Electors and the Electoral College 
Each state receives a number of presidential electors equal to the number of 
representatives and senators allocated to that state.16 Because the Constitution 
guarantees each state at least one representative and exactly two senators, each 
state receives at least three presidential electors.17 The District of Columbia 
receives presidential electors equal to the number of the smallest state’s 
delegation.18 
Allocation of members of the House of Representatives varies from decade 
to decade depending on the results of the census.19 As a result, each state’s 
 
 12. CALIF. CONST., art. XXI, § 2(d), amended by Proposition 20, enacted as The Voters FIRST 
Act for Congress, 2010. 
 13. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14), amended by Proposition 106, enacted 2000. See also 
Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1812 
(2012). 
 14. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20, amended by Amendment 6, 2010. 
 15. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking About Law & 
Democracy in Rucho v. Common Cause, draft at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3462697 [https://perma.cc/HZS2-G67A]; ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF 
CONSTITUENCY 6–8 (2005). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint . . . a Number of Electors, equal 
to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the 
Congress . . .”). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“each State shall have at Least one Representative”); art. I, § 
3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State . . .”). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“Representatives . . . 
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according 
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number of presidential electors can increase or decrease from census to census. 
States are acutely aware of this effect and raise concerns about their influence in 
the Electoral College when the Census Bureau considers changes that might 
diminish that state’s influence.20 
Of course, part of the fight among states stems from the fact that Congress 
has fixed the size of the House of Representatives at 435 members since 1911.21 
That means states gain seats in the House only at the expense of other states 
losing seats. And that means gaining influence in the Electoral College only at 
the expense of other states. 
States also have the choice of how to award presidential electors. Forty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia in all recent presidential elections have 
awarded their presidential electors on a “winner-take-all” basis, where the 
candidate who wins a plurality of the popular vote in the state wins all of the 
state’s presidential electors.22 Most states do it this way because it maximizes 
the state’s political leverage in the Electoral College.23 
Two states, however, operate differently. Maine and Nebraska award two 
electoral votes to the winner of the statewide popular vote, symbolic of two 
statewide senators.24 The remaining electors—in recent years, two in Maine, 
three in Nebraska—are awarded to the winner of the plurality of the popular vote 
in each of the state’s congressional districts.25 
In 2008, for instance, John McCain won four of Nebraska’s electoral votes, 
but Barack Obama won one electoral vote in Nebraska’s second congressional 
district, home of Omaha.26 In 2016, Hillary Clinton won three of Maine’s 
electoral votes, but Donald Trump won one electoral vote in Maine’s second 
congressional district, home of the rural northern portion of the state.27 
 
to their respective Numbers . . . The actual Enumeration shall be made . . . within every subsequent 
term of ten Years . . .”). 
 20. See, e.g., Brief of Government Respondents at 2–3, 13, 22, 62–63, Department of 
Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (No. 18-966). 
 21. See Apportionment Act of 1911, Pub. L. 62-5, 37 Stat. 13 (creating a House of 
Representatives with 433 members, and two more members upon the entry of Arizona and New 
Mexico into the Union); Reapportionment Act of 1929, S. 312, 71st Cong. § 22 (1929) (calling for 
apportioning “the then existing number of Representatives among the several States”, with brief 
exceptions increasing the size of the House upon the admission of Hawaii and Alaska as states). 
 22. 270 To Win, Split Electors Vote in Maine and Nebraska, 270towin.com, https://www.270 
towin.com/content/split-electoral-votes-maine-and-nebraska/ [https://perma.cc/WL59-WHVV] 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2020). 
 23. See, e.g., John F. Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the 
Electoral College, 13 VILLANOVA L. REV. 303, 316–17 (1968). 
 24. 270 To Win, supra note 22. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Election Results 2008, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/ 
2008/results/states/nebraska.html [https://perma.cc/T7RL-XCZL]. 
 27. Election 2016, Maine Results, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
elections/2016/results/maine [https://perma.cc/8ENP-4SX8]. 
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Drawing congressional districts can affect how these presidential electoral 
votes are awarded. Granted, it’s just two states. But the scheme does give a 
reason to wonder whether other states ought to follow—if the districts are drawn 
for congressional elections, it’s unclear why one would stack presidential elector 
selection into those same districts. 
Furthermore, some political parties choose the presidential electors who will 
ultimately cast votes in the Electoral College by congressional district.28 This is 
a strange choice—if the election is not taking place by congressional district, 
why choose electors by district in states like Washington, Minnesota, and 
Colorado? These are not random states. Congressional precinct meetings of the 
Democratic Party took place in 2016 to choose presidential electors. In these 
meetings dominated by supporters of Bernie Sanders, local parties gathered to 
choose presidential electors.29 And by the time the Electoral College met in 
December 2016, electors in each of these states tried to be faithless by voting for 
someone other than Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton, despite the fact that 
she carried the popular vote in that state—and in some cases, these electors 
successfully voted for someone else.30 These electors had been chosen at 
localized party meetings at the congressional district level rather than through a 
statewide process or a process subject to national supervision.31 
B. Presidential Primaries and State Political Parties 
The Republican and Democratic Parties each hold a series of presidential 
primaries around the United States every four years to choose that party’s 
presidential nominee. The elections are staggered across the country, and each 
state’s format can vary—whether to hold a caucus or a primary, whether non-
party members may participate, and so on. 
Presidential primaries are formally elections to choose delegates to a 
national convention, and those delegates choose the presidential candidate.32 
 
 28. Demystifying the Electoral College, American Bar Association (Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/Programs/19th-amendment-centennial/ 
toolkit/demystifying-the-electoral-college/ [https://perma.cc/QBV6-4CGK]. 
 29. See Derek T. Muller, Simplifying Presidential Primaries, in A BETTER CANDIDATE: 
IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (Michael R. 
Dimino & Eugene Mazo eds.) (forthcoming). 
 30. See, e.g., Baca v. Hickenlooper, 935 F.3d 887, 901 (10th Cir. 2019); In the Matter of 
Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808, 817 (Wash. 2019); Abdurrahman v. Dayton, 903 F.3d 813, 815 (8th 
Cir. 2018). 
 31. Electoral College: About the Electors, NATIONAL ARCHIVE, https://www.archives.gov/ 
electoral-college/electors#selection [https://perma.cc/V9N5-YKTJ] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020); 
How Are Electors Chosen?, Taegan Goddard’s Electoral Vote Map, https://electoralvotemap.com/ 
how-are-electors-chosen/#By_State_Party_Convention [https://perma.cc/VPJ4-9YVE] (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2020). 
 32. See, e.g., John C. Greer, Rules Governing Presidential Primaries, 48 J. OF POL. 1006 
(1986). 
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That said, the delegates are typically pledged to support a particular candidate.33 
Republicans and Democrats have thousands of delegates who participate in the 
nominating convention.34 The parties allocate delegates across the states and 
territories by specific factors, including the population of the state and the 
number of elected officials from that state.35 
Within each state, the parties offer different methods for winning electors. 
Some may occur on a winner-take-all basis;36 in others, delegates are awarded 
in proportion to the popular vote that each candidate receives.37 Another 
common feature is to award delegates to candidates based on the voting results 
of each congressional district.38 
There are understandable reasons to divide delegates by congressional 
district. Congressional districts ensure that winning candidates secure broader 
geographic support.39 And delegates come from each congressional district 
regardless of the winning candidate,40 which also ensures broad geographic 
representation from all parts of the state. And if each congressional district has 
roughly equal numbers of people, maybe it makes sense for delegates to be 
roughly evenly distributed, too. 
 
 33. Michael T. Morley, Reforming the Contested Convention: Rethinking the Presidential 
Nomination Process, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1073, 1094–95 (2016). 
 34. See, e.g., Election 2016 – Republican Delegate Count, REALCLEARPOLITICS, 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/republican_delegate_count.html 
[https://perma.cc/55ZY-C9KF] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020) (tracking 2,472 delegates for the 2016 
Republican National Convention); Election 2016 – Republican Delegate Count, 
REALCLEARPOLITICS, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/democratic_dele 
gate_count.html [https://perma.cc/6BJ3-MU4R] (last visited Jan 11. 2020) (tracking 4,763 
delegates for the 2016 Democratic National Convention). 
 35. See Delegate Selection Materials For the 2016 Democratic National Convention, 
DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., I.F–H & Rule 8(A), https://www.demrulz.org/wp-content/files/12. 
15.14_2016_Delegate_Selection_Documents_Mailing_-_Rules_Call_Regs_Model_Plan_Check 
list_12.15.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XZG-PSNW] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020); The Rules of the 
Republican Party, REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., Rule 14(a), https://s3.amazonaws.com/prod-static-
ngop-pbl/docs/Rules_of_the_Republican+Party_FINAL_S14090314.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ5 
W-PMCT] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
 36. See RNC Rule 16(a)(1). 
 37. See id. See also DNC Rule 9(C)(1) (stating that membership on the State Party Committee 
is apportioned on the basis of population). 
 38. RNC Rule 16(c)(3)(i); DNC Rule 8(C). 
 39. See, e.g., RNC Rule 16(d)(9) (“Delegates and alternate delegates to the national 
convention representing congressional districts shall be residents of and qualified voters in said 
districts . . .”); Section DNC Rules Section III.A.4a & Rule 12.H (“A district-level delegate and 
alternate candidate may run for election only within the district in which he or she is registered to 
vote.”). 
 40. Id. 
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Close scrutiny reveals oddities.41 In 2016 in California, Democrats allocated 
between four and nine delegates per district, based on total population plus extra 
delegates in districts with more Democratic voters.42 The 13th District in 
Oakland, home of senior congressional representative Barbara Lee, had about 
260,000 registered Democrats and received eight delegates.43 That’s one 
delegate per 32,500 eligible voters.44 But some Orange County districts, like the 
42nd and 50th, had 86,000 registered Democrats and received five delegates—
or one delegate per 17,200 eligible voters.45 Democrats in the San Francisco Bay 
area would have less power than Democrats in Orange County. 
For Republicans, the results are reversed, and more dramatically. 
Republicans awarded three delegates to each district, regardless of party 
membership.46 There were just 27,000 registered Republicans in the 13th, or one 
delegate for every 9000 eligible voters.47 But in the 48th, in Orange County, 
there were more than 155,000 registered Republicans, one delegate per 51,000 
voters.48 
This process seems unusual. If the point of the primary is to allow 
Republicans to choose the Republican nominee and Democrats the Democratic 
nominee, a system that gives more weight to places with fewer Republicans and 
Democrats seems backward. Indeed, Orange County (until 2018, at least) had a 
strong Republican congressional delegation,49 while San Francisco is a home of 
key Democratic leaders.50 Giving voters in those jurisdictions less power makes 
little sense. But congressional districts are so convenient. The state is chopped 
up into areas of equal population, covering the entire state. 
 
 41. Derek T. Muller, Awarding Presidential Delegates by Congressional District is Unfair, 
THE SACRAMENTO BEE (June, 6, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/soap 
box/article81725617.html [https://perma.cc/C648-Q684] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
 42. Id.; 2016 Presidential Primaries, Caucuses, and Conventions, THE GREEN PAPERS, 
http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/CA-D [https://perma.cc/84XE-GAQP] (last visited Jan. 11, 
2020). 
 43. Muller, supra note 41. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Muller, supra note 41. 
 49. Adam Nagourney & Robert Gebeloff, In Orange County, a Republican Fortress Turns 
Democratic, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/us/orange-county 
-republicans-democrats-demographics.html [https://perma.cc/X7SA-R6CQ] (last visited Feb. 1, 
2020); REGISTRATION BY US CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, (May 23, 2016), https://elections.cdn. 
sos.ca.gov/ror/15day-presprim-2016/congressional.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8C6-TJ7Y] (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2020). 
 50. REGISTRATION BY US CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, supra note 49. 
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C. Ballot Access and Signature Gathering Requirements 
States have ballot access rules to determine which candidates are eligible to 
appear on the ballot. They also have rules that determine which citizen initiatives 
may appear on the ballot. Initiative proponents must secure signatures in a fixed 
period for the initiative to appear on the ballot. But some place geographic 
conditions on compiling signatures. Nevada, for instance, requires that ballot 
initiative proponents gather signatures from registered voters totaling at least ten 
percent of the votes cast in the previous general election in each of Nevada’s 
congressional districts.51 
Some states extend similar rules to candidates seeking ballot access. 
Virginia requires that presidential primary candidates secure signatures from at 
least 5000 registered voters, including at least 200 signatures from voters in each 
congressional district.52 New Mexico requires presidential nominating petitions 
for candidates of national political parties to submit petitions signed by 
registered voters in each congressional district totaling at least two percent of 
the total votes cast in each congressional district in the prior presidential 
election.53 Louisiana requires independent presidential candidates to secure 
5000 signatures from registered voters to appear on the ballot, including at least 
500 signatures from each congressional district.54 Michigan requires 
independent presidential candidates to secure 30,000 signatures, including at 
least 100 signatures from at least half of the state’s congressional districts.55 
While candidates win statewide office with the most votes in the state, or 
voters can enact ballot measures with a statewide popular support, these 
signature requirements precondition ballot access on distinct expressions of 
regional support. 
D. Miscellaneous Congressional District Rules 
Finally, there are a series of what I describe as “miscellaneous” 
congressional district rules. These do not neatly fit into the categories above, and 
they run across many categories. 
Consider the military academies in the United States. Nominations to the 
United States Military Academy, United States Naval Academy, and United 
States Air Force Academy include several allocations to each state and 
congressional district.56 Positions at each academy are guaranteed five from 
each congressional district, as nominated by the representative from the 
 
 51. NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 295.012, 293.069 (2019); Angle v. Miller, 
673 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 52. VA. CODE § 24.2-545 (2019). 
 53. N.M. STAT. § 1-15A-6 (2019). 
 54. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 18:1254(C), 18:465(C)(1) (2019). 
 55. MICH. COMP. L. § 168.590b (2020). 
 56. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 9442, 8454, 7442 (2020). 
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district.57 Or consider the Depository Library Act of 1962, which requires at 
least two library depositories in each congressional district for government 
publications.58 
A state might create a governing body built upon congressional districts. For 
instance, the Tennessee state schoolboard is an appointive body of nine 
members, one from each congressional district, plus an ex officio member and a 
student representative.59 
States might award collegiate scholarships by congressional district. In 
Connecticut, the CHET scholarship is divided among the State’s five 
congressional districts.60 Fifteen scholarships are given to high school seniors 
and freshmen in each district.61 In Missouri, the Women Legislators of Missouri 
award one collegiate scholarship to a graduating high school senior in each of 
the State’s eight congressional districts.62 A scholarship award might not even 
by codified in a statute—it could simply be a rule of thumb a non-profit entity 
creates. 
III.  THE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT AS CHAMELEON 
One would be hard-pressed to view the primary purpose of drawing of 
congressional districts as anything but the drawing of districts to elect members 
to Congress. Still, these congressional districts can shape the selection of 
presidential primary delegates, presidential electors, ballot initiatives, ballot 
access rules, the composition of the military academies, and even college 
scholarships. Congressional districts, then, can function like a chameleon—take 
a given law, or even a non-legal practice like a scholarship award, and the 
congressional district is there, with the hue to fit whatever regime may govern. 
Why use the congressional district for so many purposes? The single most 
compelling reason is to ensure geographic diversity of areas of equal population. 
Congressional districts are non-overlapping, single-member districts that 
embrace the entirety of the geography of a state. Districts are drawn every ten 
years with equal populations residing with them. This means that a state might 
be divided into a few or several equal-sized regions. Unlike state, county, or 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 1901–05 (2020). 
 59. TENN. CODE § 49-1-301(a)(1) (2020); see Tennessee State Board of Education, Board 
Members, TN.gov, https://www.tn.gov/sbe/about-us/board-members.html [https://perma.cc/YC 
7B-9YB7] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
 60. Official Rules: CHET Advance Scholarship 2018-2019 School Year, CHET, 
https://www.chetadvance.com/documents/2018-2019-CHET-Advance-Rules-FINAL.pdf 
[https://per ma.cc/MPN4-ZG4D] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Alisha Shurr, Women Legislators of Missouri Raise $10K for Scholarships, THE MISSOURI 
TIMES, (Mar. 1, 2019), https://themissouritimes.com/57759/women-legislators-of-missouri-raise-
10k-for-scholarships/ [https://perma.cc/CA75-22SG] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
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municipal boundaries, congressional districts are regularly altered in shape and 
size to adjust for changes in the population. 
Ensuring that each member of Congress gets to nominate members to the 
military academies is more than a nice perk for each member of the House. It 
guarantees broad geographic diversity of our nation’s military officers.63 
Tennessee’s appointive school board ensures that its membership hales from 
across the state and that each member represents roughly equal numbers of 
constituents. 
Signature-gathering requirements can also advance similar state interests. 
Before a ballot measure can appear on the ballot, the state may want to guarantee 
that there is at least mild breadth of geographic support for the measure before 
it appears on the ballot. The same holds true to ensure that serious candidates 
secure ballot access. In today’s age of “one person, one vote,” the dominant view 
is that elections ought to occur through a single constituency. Weighing voters’ 
influence based upon their geographic diversity is often disfavored. Even so, 
states continue to express preferences for breadth of support through these 
congressional district signature requirements. 
Presidential primary rules that center on congressional districts also advance 
similar preferences for geographic breadth of support. Those rules can also 
encourage local party-building at the congressional level, which could translate 
into party success in federal elections. But as currently constituted, such rules 
may distort the presidential selection process. If party delegates are awarded per 
congressional district without accounting for the disparities of party members 
across congressional districts, as the California example above shows, the 
congressional districts with the greatest party loyalty may be the ones with the 
least influence in the presidential primary. 
The disparities across congressional districts aren’t just limited to different 
partisan makeups. Districts are drawn based on total population because of the 
dominate theory that legislators represent roughly equal numbers of 
constituents.64 Districts are not drawn to divide registered voters equally, or to 
divide other subpopulations. That might mean some districts have far more 
younger residents than others. That, in turn, could distort opportunities for 
military academy service or to secure college scholarships. Given two equal-
sized districts, but one with far more young families graduating far more high 
school students each year, competition will be fiercer in that district despite it 
being equal in size to other districts. Maybe those disparities are too 
inconsequential, or maybe this is simply the most efficient way to ensure 
 
 63. See R. Eric Petersen & Sarah J. Eckman, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service 
Academies: An Overview and Resource for Outreach and Management, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE (April 13, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33213.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DZU4-W8E7] (last visited. Jan. 11, 2020). 
 64. See Levinson, supra note 8, at 1281. 
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geographic diversity. But it’s worth acknowledging the potential weakness of 
using congressional districts for such diverse purposes. 
Using the congressional district as a site to choose a presidential elector to 
fill out a party’s slate is also an odd choice. It might ensure geographic diversity 
in presidential electors. But surely, electors’ loyalty to the party’s nominee 
seems a far more important trait. There is nothing particularly localized about 
slates of presidential electors, typically awarded on a winner-take-all basis, 
anyway. And given the mostly ministerial role of presidential electors, loyalty 
rather than local judgment would seem preferable. 
Finally, partisan gerrymandering might make chameleon congressional 
districts less desirable. If state legislatures draw congressional districts to 
entrench the interests of one party over another, that could spill over to other 
contexts. It might advantage political partisans in the selection of military 
academy members, or it could make securing signatures on certain measures or 
candidate petitions in some congressional districts more challenging. 
Of course, developing feasible alternatives may not be terribly practical. 
Congressional districts are simple and convenient ways of parceling geography 
into equal units of population. True, there might be more high school graduates 
in some districts than others, or more Republicans than Democrats, or more pro-
initiative rather than anti-initiative on particular topics. But maybe these are not 
so systematically problematic that we ought to abolish our system of using 
congressional districts for many purposes. 
Two domains of the chameleon congressional district, however, merit 
reconsideration. The first is the use of congressional districts in the awarding of 
presidential primary delegates. Parties—particularly the Republican Party, 
which gives no additional weight to districts with greater numbers of Republican 
voters—ought to more seriously weigh delegate allocation based on party 
membership in a jurisdiction. Districts with more registered voters for that party, 
or who cast more votes for that party in the previous election, should have more 
delegates than those with fewer. That, in turn, gives the most party-faithful 
districts a greater say in the presidential selection process. 
Second, parties should end the party’s naming of presidential electors within 
congressional districts. Electors should be selected with greater party oversight 
or on a statewide basis. That would reduce the likelihood of highly localized 
processes leading to the selection of electors who are unlikely to be faithful in 
casting a vote for the party’s nominee. 
In the end, state legislatures and redistricting commissions will redraw 
congressional districts after the 2020 census. But redrawing them will alter far 
more than the composition of the House of Representatives. And when they 
redistrict, legislators ought to think more seriously about how their redistricting 
can affect many other regimes in the United States. 
  
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
684 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:673 
 
